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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Estimating the National Impact of the Financial Crisis in 
Indonesia by Combining a Rapid Qualitative Study with 
Nationally Representative Surveys 
Neil McCulloch,* Amit Grover 
 
 
This paper draws on a rapid qualitative assessment of the impact of the financial crisis in 
Indonesia to generate hypotheses about the potential national impacts. We test these 
hypotheses using nationally representative labor force surveys from before and after the 
onset of the financial crisis. We find that Indonesia weathered the storm rather well: there is 
no evidence for increased school dropouts; labor force participation fell, particularly for 
young workers, whilst unemployment rose for the young, but fell for workers over 25. The 
changes for female workers were the same as those for male workers and there do not appear 
to have been any major sectoral shifts in labor. Surprisingly, we find that real wages for 
employees rose significantly during the crisis period, although those in the informal sector 
did not benefit to the same extent. Our results are similar to those from the earlier qualitative 
study, except that, because it focused on areas harder hit by the crisis, the qualitative study 
did not observe the significant gains made by employees over the crisis period. 
 
JEL Codes: J30, R23, O53 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During 2009, a large number of papers were written about the impact of the global financial crisis 
on developing countries (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2009; IMF, 2009; Mendoza, 2009; Naude, 
2009; ODI, 2009; World Bank, 2009). Most of these papers focus on the macroeconomic impact 
of the crisis, elaborating the effect of the crisis on GDP growth, current and capital account 
balances, debt, and inflation. However, policymakers have also been keen to understand the 
microeconomic impact of the crisis, most notably on poverty and employment. In previous crises, 
researchers have attempted to estimate such impacts by simulating the impact of the crisis based 
on precrisis data, along with macroeconomic data on the shocks and some assumptions about the 
pathways through which households are likely to have been affected (e.g., Friedman and 
Levinsohn, 2002). Such papers can be extremely valuable in giving policymakers an indication of 
the groups within society that are likely to be most affected in order to put in place suitable policy 
responses. However, inevitably, the results are dependent on the assumptions made about the 
channels of transmission and, therefore, may not accurately reflect what has actually happened.  
 
An alternative way of obtaining timely information about the impact of the crisis on households is 
to undertake rapid qualitative evaluations in selected locations. These have been done in several 
countries.1 These are extremely valuable in that they give detailed accounts of what has actually 
happened in the selected communities. They also help to uncover the pathways through which 
impacts have been felt and to provide preliminary indications about the effectiveness of various 
assistance programs.  However, budget and time constraints mean that such studies can usually be 
done only in a small number of locations in the country and, therefore, it is not clear the extent to 
which the results are typical of those that might be found elsewhere.   
 
Fortunately, for Indonesia—and a few other countries—there is now national survey data 
from both before and after the crisis. This provides an opportunity to draw on the strengths 
of both qualitative and quantitative analysis: qualitative case studies can be used to derive 
hypotheses about which groups are likely to be most affected and through which channels; the 
nationally representative quantitative data can then be used to test these hypotheses. 
Conversely, quantitative data may provide interesting results which can then be explored in 
more depth through subsequent qualitative work (Kanbur, 2003).  
 
To preview our main results, we find that, despite being done in only a handful of locations, 
the qualitative studies paint a reasonably accurate picture of how the crisis has (or has not) 
affected households throughout Indonesia. The macroeconomic shocks experienced by 
Indonesia—relative to many other countries—have been quite mild.  For Indonesia, this crisis 
is only a shadow of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. However, growth did slow sharply 
at the end of 2008 and there was a rapid contraction in trade and major falls in commodity 
prices of importance to Indonesia. One might therefore expect to see a significant impact on 
unemployment or wages, at least in the affected sectors. One might also expect to see children 
withdrawn from school, particularly at the more senior levels. In fact, we see little evidence for 
changes in school dropouts or attendance, except for younger students where dropout rates 
fell and attendance improved. Similarly, labor participation is unchanged for most, but reduces 
for younger workers. Unemployment declines and there is no evidence for sectoral shifts in 
employment. Perhaps our most surprising finding is of significant and large increases in real 
wages for employees over the period of the financial crisis, although those outside the formal 
sector do not share in this improvement. 
                                                 
1See Hossain and Eyben (2009) for syntheses of qualitative country case studies. 
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Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains Indonesia’s macroeconomic performance 
prior to and during the crisis period. Section 3 summarises the results from an early qualitative 
study of the impact of this financial crisis in two villages in Indonesia. Section 4 describes our 
data and its limitations. Section 5 then describes our results focusing on changes in school 
dropout and attendance, as well as changes in the labor market, notably in employment, hours 
worked and wages, using cross-sectional data from February 2008, August 2008, and February 
2009.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
II. INDONESIAN MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT2 
 
Indonesia’s economy was performing reasonably well prior to the onset of the current crisis in 
the last quarter of 2008. GDP growth averaged more than 5% a year during 2001–2008 and 
was on an increasing trend. In the year up to the third quarter of 2008 GDP growth was 6.4% 
(Yudo et al., 2009). Unemployment was falling, as were poverty numbers, albeit slowly.  
Inflation, which peaked at 11% in mid-2008 due to the global food price crisis and reductions 
in government fuel subsidies, was falling steadily. Investment had been growing at 12% (year 
on year/YOY), with large increases in capital goods imports and this, along with the higher 
price of imported fuel, resulted in import growth of 65% in the year to the third quarter of 
2008.  But exports had also been performing well in the preceding years, driven by the boom 
in commodity prices. Total exports reached US$136 billion in 2008, 20% above the 2007’s 
exports, which in turn were 13% above the 2006 levels. Agricultural and natural resource 
goods contributed most to export growth—notably, crude palm oil (CPO), rubber, ores, 
minerals, petroleum, and natural gas. Exports of certain manufactured products such as 
clothing, footwear, and automotive parts also increased considerably (World Bank, 2008).  
Indonesia’s strong merchandise trade surplus, particularly in 2006 and 2007, gave rise to 
surpluses on the current account, which—when added to inflows of foreign capital—resulted 
in a balance of payments of more than 3% of GDP. Although the collapse in commodity 
prices in 2008 pushed the balance of payments into deficit, Indonesia’s foreign reserves were 
still almost US$58 billion by mid-2008. 
 
In fact, the macroeconomic shock experienced by Indonesia did not start with the global 
financial crisis.  Commodity prices collapsed in the latter half of 2008, stabilizing in early 2009 
at around 40% of their mid-2008 peaks. The price falls particularly affected the sectors which 
had contributed most to export growth in the preceding years. The financial crisis 
compounded these falls. As a result, export values dropped sharply—by January 2009 export 
values were 36.1% below the level of a year earlier—with the fall in oil prices by more than 
two-thirds driving much of this drop. But export volumes also fell with reduced demand from 
key markets and, by the first quarter of 2009, were almost a fifth lower than the previous year. 
Imports also fell at least as fast as exports. Total import values in the first quarter of 2009 
were down one third relative to the previous year. Again this was driven by the sharp falls in 
the price of oil, but import volume was also down by 28%, with falls in intermediate goods as 
well as capital and transport goods contributing to this.  
 
On the capital account, sharp reversals of portfolio flows in the last quarter of 2008 
contributed to a major fall in the value of shares on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. At the 
end of 2008, domestic equity market capitalization was down 51%. The exchange rate also 
came under significant pressure and fell from around Rp9,200 to Rp11,325 per US$ by the 
                                                 
2This section draws heavily on World Bank (2009). Indonesia Economic Quarterly: Weathering the Storm. 
Jakarta. and Yudo et al. (2009).  
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end of the final quarter of 2008 (Yudo et al., 2009). Real investment dropped in the first 
quarter of 2009 due to lower spending on machinery, appliances, and transport equipment, in 
contrast to growth rates of around 12% in much of 2007 and 2008.  Credit also fell sharply—
approvals for new loans were down by 50%–60% in March 2009 (YOY). 
 
Taken on its own, therefore, Indonesia experienced a significant macroeconomic shock at the 
end of 2008. However, of course, Indonesia was not on its own. Indeed, Indonesia was one of 
the least affected countries in South East Asia. Although its GDP growth slowed markedly to 
4.4% in the first quarter of 2009, it did not experience the collapse in growth experienced by 
countries such as Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia. In part, this was because the major impact 
has been through exports and the share of Indonesia’s output that is exported is the smallest 
of all the major South East Asian economies (World Bank, 2009). Growth in recent years has 
been driven predominantly by nontradeables rather than tradeables and, although the crisis 
reduced growth across the board, sectors such as transport and communications as well as 
utilities have continued to grow in double digits. At the same time, the tradeable sector having 
performed best is agriculture, which—at 4.8%—has experienced its strongest growth since the 
East Asian crisis, helping to compensate for the effects of the crisis.   
 
Moreover, Indonesia’s economic performance in 2009 has been remarkably good, with 
predictions of full-year GDP growth of over 4%. The stock market has restored all of the 
substantial losses associated with the crisis and inflation had declined to 2.78% by the end of 
2009 due to the falls in international commodity and fuel prices.3 Food inflation has fallen 
particularly fast, helping poor households. Domestic credit growth continues to be much 
lower than in 2008, but this may reflect declining demand for loans as well as more stringent 
lending conditions. 
 
Indonesia’s relatively good performance in the crisis may also be due to strong responses on the 
part of the government. Interest rates, while initially high to counter the inflation caused by high 
food prices and booming bank credit, were brought down quickly from 9.5% in June 2008 to 
6.5% by September 2009. Careful management by the Central Bank, including the arrangement of 
foreign exchange swaps and setting up with donors a large public expenditure support facility of 
US$4 billion, have restored confidence in the markets, bringing the exchange rate down to pre-
crisis levels. Steps were also taken to bolster confidence in the banks, providing greater deposit 
insurance, along with a series of measures to provide greater liquidity. 
 
In addition, the government approved a major fiscal stimulus of 1.4% of GDP. More than 
half of this took the form of tax reductions in Corporate and Personal Income Tax, although 
Payroll tax subsidies and additional infrastructure expenditure also played a role. The 
government has also expanded the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM 
Mandiri) to focus on labor intensive employment creation and SME development.  During the 
peak of the crisis it also temporarily reintroduced its Unconditional Cash Transfer program for 
19 million households, although this was stopped at the end of March 2009.  The 2009 budget 
has also provided for access to free healthcare for all at local clinics.  Finally, although not an 
explicit support program, the nationwide elections in April 2009 and the subsequent 
presidential election in July gave rise to large quantities of local expenditure by the competing 
parties from around March 2009 onwards. 
 
Table 1 shows the key macroeconomic variables for Indonesia before the crisis, during the last 
quarter of 2008, and for mid-2009.   
                                                 
3See www.bps.go.id for latest inflation figures. 
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Table 1. Selected Macroeconomic Variables for Indonesia before, during, and after 
the Crisis 
Growth % (YOY) 3rd Quarter 2008 1st Quarter 2009 3rd quarter 2009 
GDP 6.4 4.4 4.2 
Inflation 13.5a 8.48a 2.83a 
Exports 10.6 -19.1 -22.3b 
Imports 11 -24.1 -30.84b 
Exchange rate (Rp/US$) 9,331 11,517 9,633 
Investment 12.2 3.5 4 
Source: Statistics Indonesia, World Bank (2009). 
aInflation figures are YOY figures for the end of the last month of each quarter. 
bJan–Oct 2009 over Jan–Oct 2008. 
 
The macroeconomic evidence above makes it clear that, for Indonesia, this was no East Asian 
crisis. Indonesia’s macroeconomic management has been good and macroeconomic indicators 
have been remarkably stable given the size of the shock experienced. Nonetheless, the 
experience of the East Asian crisis should lead us to expect very heterogeneous impacts upon 
households. Although the average economic performance may suggest little impact, it is 
possible that particular subgroups in society may have been severely affected. The 
macroeconomic data give some pointers to the sorts of effects which we might expect to 
observe at the household level. In particular, the large decline in exports would lead us to 
expect strong effects on communities that are dependent on commodities which have 
experienced major price declines. Similarly, the two sectors most affected appear to be 
manufacturing as well as the trade, hotel, and restaurant sectors. The decline in manufacturing 
output would lead us to expect firms to lay off workers, particularly those on short-term (or 
nonformal) contracts. This is likely to have affected predominantly medium-skilled young 
urban workers in the areas in which these industries are concentrated. In addition, the trade, 
hotel, and restaurant sector is a major employer. Declining output in this sector would lead us 
to expect either falling employment or reductions in real wages.   
 
Moreover, the macroeconomic data say little about whether the crisis has affected the young 
more or less than the older, the worse educated more than the better educated, women more 
than men, and the poor more than the nonpoor. To address these questions, we need to 
examine the effects experienced directly by communities, households, and individuals. 
 
 
III. QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF THE 
CRISIS4 
 
When the financial crisis first broadened beyond the US in the last quarter of 2008, the 
Institute of Development Studies undertook a set of rapid qualitative assessments with its 
research partners in five countries (Hossain and Eyben, 2009), one of which was Indonesia.5  
A set of participatory methods were employed to explore the impact of the crisis, the 
pathways through which that impact had been felt, and both government and household level 
responses. The work done over two weeks in February 2009 in two villages, purposively 
                                                 
4This section draws heavily on Fillaili, R. et al. (2009). 
5The others were Kenya, Jamaica, Zambia, and Bangladesh. 
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chosen because it was felt that they would be most likely to illustrate the impact of the crisis.6  
One rural and one urban village were selected.   
 
The urban village, Gandasari, is in Kabupaten (District of) Bekasi, just outside the capital city 
Jakarta. It is the site of a major Industrial Park, home to over 170 mostly large Japanese, 
Korean, and US manufacturing firms and with a total employment of around 73,000 
employees. As a result, Desa Gandasari houses a large number of migrant workers from other 
parts of Indonesia who work in the Industrial Park.  Anecdotal reports (and the macroanalysis 
above) suggested that this was one of the hardest hit groups. 
 
The rural village, Simpang Empat, in Kabupaten Banjar, in South Kalimantan is heavily dependent 
on local rubber plantations. A large number of households are dependent on rubber for livelihood, 
either directly as tappers, or indirectly through trading activities, or the provision of goods and 
services to the local community.  In addition, nearby coal stockpiles can also generate significant 
employment. Both coal and rubber prices have dropped dramatically from their mid-2008 peaks.  
The study in this area focused on the impact that this shock has had. 
 
The methodology in both areas combined a wide range of participatory and qualitative 
research methods over a two-week period. Information was collected on changes in prices of 
local consumer and producer prices, as well as other measures of overall wellbeing. People 
were asked to describe how these had changed over the previous year, as well as how this 
crisis compared with the 1997/1998 crisis. In addition, information was collected about 
household responses to the shock and their coping strategies, as well as the responses of the 
government, nongovernment organizations (NGO), and the community. Finally, the study 
noted local perceptions about how the crisis had affected social life, security, and intra-
household relations. 
 
The data were collected through a series of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), 
and direct observations. In-depth interviews were conducted with the head of the village, village 
officials, and local leaders. The village level FGDs were held with the village elites and dusun7 
representatives. The village level FGD was used to generate a matrix ranking of the most affected 
groups. A further four FGDs were then conducted separately for men and women in the two 
most affected groups. These FGDs identified a time line of shocks and underlying trends, 
identified and ranked the problems faced by the participants, discussed the causes of those 
problems and the coping mechanisms adopted by the community. In addition, the FGDs used a 
Venn Diagram to identify the various institutions that support the community and assess the 
extent to which different groups can access these institutions and their relative importance. 
 
The FGDs were complemented with a set of in-depth interviews with a minimum of six 
households in each village, including at least two female-headed households. These interviews 
were used to get a better understanding on the impact of the crisis at the household level, their 
coping strategies, and the forms of institutional support available. In-depth interviews were 
also conducted with local economic players, nongovernment organizations, government 
officials, and program implementers. Finally, a transect walk was undertaken to provide a 
direct observation of the local housing conditions, land use, as well as the availability and the 
condition of various public services.8  
                                                 
6The speed with which the assessment had to be fielded also meant that villages which were already known to the 
researchers were chosen.  
7A dusun is an administrative area within a village, consisting of a number of RT (neighborhood units). 
8For full details see Fillaili et al. (2009). 
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Key findings from the Qualitative Studies 
 
The qualitative studies provided a rich and nuanced picture of the impact of the crisis in the 
two selected villages. We highlight here the key findings relating to the impact on 
employment, wages, and schooling that relate to our subsequent quantitative analysis.  
 
Perhaps the most common complaint in both locations was the persistence of high prices for 
food, agricultural inputs, and transport. This reflected the rapid rise in food and fuel prices 
during 2008 as a result of the spike in world food and fuel prices during 2008 and the 
subsequent reduction in national fuel subsidies. Respondents were aware that world fuel prices 
have fallen significantly since, but said that these had not yet translated into reductions in 
prices for food and agricultural inputs (the price of fuel is fixed by the government). Thus 
respondents felt that the financial crisis was adding to the problems that they were already 
facing due to high prices. 
 
In the rural location, it was clear that the economy has been severely affected by the collapse 
in rubber and coal prices. The decline in production has reduced the income of workers in 
both sectors and this, in turn, has led to a decline in other economic activities in the village, 
including food stalls, traders, and shops selling agricultural inputs. The reduction in job 
opportunities has forced some men to shift to service activities—such as car/motorbike 
cleaning, repairs, and ojek (motorcycle taxi)—or to migrate to other regions for work, e.g., by 
participating in illegal gold mining in Sulawesi.   
 
In the urban village, reduced foreign demand for automotive, electronic, and consumer goods 
has led to a reduction in working hours in the factories, the removal of overtime for workers, 
reductions in additional benefits (such as transport and food allowances), the temporary layoff 
of permanent workers, and the discontinuation of contract workers. Most migrant workers 
that had been dismissed had already returned to their hometown; the few that have stayed said 
that their savings can only support them for a couple of months. As in Simpang Empat, the 
decline in production activities has had a knock on the impact on economic activities of 
related business (e.g., catering, waste handling, and transport) as well as broader village 
economy (e.g., dormitory rental, food stalls, shops, and ojek). 
 
Interestingly, both communities felt that this crisis was worse than that of 1997/98.  In the 
rubber plantation and coal mining region, the sharp depreciation of the Rupiah in the 1997/98 
crisis led to a large increase in the prices of food and other consumable goods, but this was 
compensated by a sharp increase in the price of rubber and coal.  Similarly in the industrial 
region, the depreciation during the 1997/1998 crisis had increased exports from the industrial 
park, so there were no layoffs and their purchasing power was maintained.   
 
Notwithstanding these effects, neither community saw reductions in primary, junior high, or 
senior high school attendance, although there were cases of arrears in school payment.  
Similarly neither community reported any changes in health, although there was a shift 
towards using cheap government health clinics rather than going directly to a doctor which is 
more expensive. There has also been no reduction in meal frequency, although some 
households are consuming less or have reduced the quality of the rice that they consume and 
are eating less protein or shifted to less expensive forms of protein.  There is no indication of 
increasing child labor or domestic violence (although there were reports of increased crime 
and insecurity in the urban location).  There was also almost no indication of increased female 
participation in the labor force due to the crisis, but there was some evidence that those in the 
informal sector are having to work longer hours to make ends meet.  Finally, in the rural area, 
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there was evidence of weaker participation in arisan9 and, because these arisan are linked to 
other forms of social gatherings, there were worries that this might lead to forms of social 
exclusion for those worst affected. 
 
 
IV. DATA 
 
The statistics for employment, working status, schooling, income, and hours worked 
presented in this paper have been produced from the 2008 and 2009 Indonesian Labor Force 
Survey (known by its Indonesian acronym Sakernas). Data from three waves of this survey are 
used: February 2008, August 2008 and February 2009. The period between the first two waves 
marks the run up to the financial crisis during the midst of the global food crisis; the financial 
crisis hit Indonesia between the second and third waves of the survey.  
 
The main annual Sakernas survey is conducted by the Statistics Indonesia (BPS) every August.  
In August 2008, 931,890 individuals were sampled from 291,689 households across Indonesia.  
This large sample is designed to provide estimators which are representative at the kabupaten 
(district) level.  The February Sakernas surveys cover a random subset of the August sample. 
In 2008 and 2009, it sampled 218,833 individuals (69,114 households) and 291,689 individuals 
(68,535 households) respectively.  The February surveys are representative at the provincial 
level.  The Sakernas surveys are stratified into rural and urban samples.  However, the census 
blocks in each stratum are geographically ordered within each kabupaten and the kabupaten are 
geographically ordered within each province, so that systematic sampling provides implicit 
stratification by province and kabupaten.10 Samples are clustered at the household level. All 
estimators take into account stratification and clustering and use sample weights to calculate 
population estimates. 
 
The sampling design makes it possible to compare estimators between survey waves.  We find 
it useful to use all the three waves since the differences between February and August 2008 
can give some indication of how the food crisis was affecting households, whilst differences 
between August 2008 and February 2009 can provide evidence about the impact of the 
financial crisis. Having both annual and sub-annual comparisons also helps to identify the 
extent to which observed changes in indicators are due to seasonal variation. 
 
The Sakernas questionnaire is designed to collect data on the workforce for individuals aged 
10 and over.  However, households are only sampled if they live in a physical building and are 
either a family living together, an individual renting a room independently, or as a group of 
lodgers with less than 10 people. Lodgings with more than 10 people and people whose daily 
needs are provided for by a foundation or organization, such as a prison or dormitory, are not 
sampled. This may have implications for our analysis, since the qualitative study described 
above suggested that many of those affected by the crisis in industrial areas could be migrant 
workers. Many young migrant workers tend to live in rented blocks of one- or two-person 
rooms, known as kos. Whether or not these are included in the sample will depend on whether 
the rooms are individually rented or rented collectively, e.g., by a contract labor supply 
company.  If migrant workers are only partly sampled, depending on their living arrangements, 
indicators may not be able to fully capture the impact of the crisis on some groups of migrant 
workers and some sections of the poor who do not live in physical buildings.  
 
                                                 
9An arisan is a regular social gathering in which the members operate a rotating savings scheme. 
10See Colledge, M. (2009) for full details of the sampling methodology. 
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Because the Sakernas questionnaire only gathers data on people aged 10 and over, analysis of 
changes in participation in primary school and of child labor is limited.  However, it is possible 
to give an indication of the tradeoff between work and school for older school children by 
breaking down employment rates and school participation measures for children aged 10 to 17. 
 
Descriptive statistics are calculated for labor and schooling outcomes as well as shifts in 
working status. We use the Statistics Indonesia definitions of employment and unemployment.  
A person is employed if they are of working age (15 or over in Indonesia) and have had paid 
work in the last week, or are not working temporarily but usually have a job. A person is 
unemployed if they are not working and either looking for work or establishing a new 
business/firm or not looking for work because they feel discouraged, or are waiting to start a 
new job (see (Cuevas et al., n.d.). The Statistics Indonesia definition of unemployment is 
broader than the ILO definition because it includes people who are not working and not 
looking for work because they feel discouraged (Suryadarma et al., 2005). We use the standard 
definition of the labor force as the total employed and unemployed population.11  
 
Net monthly wages from the main work activity are defined as “the income received by a 
worker/employee which is paid in cash or in goods (in local price) paid by the establishment/employer after deducted 
with discounts, obligatory contribution, income taxes ” (Statistics Indonesia, 1996). In addition, the net 
monthly income from the main work activity is reported for single-handed enterprises, and casual 
agricultural and nonagricultural workers. However, the survey does not ask about the income of 
individuals who are owners of businesses that employ paid workers since it would be difficult to 
distinguish between the income of the business and their personal income. Thus, the Sakernas 
survey provides evidence about the wages of employees and the income levels for informal 
workers and single-handed enterprises, but cannot make any statements about the impact of the 
financial crisis on larger businesses.  
 
Moreover, wages and income may be underestimated since the questionnaire only asks for 
wages and income from the main activity; the respondent’s income will be higher if they have 
more than one job or if they are employed and simultaneously run a business. Thus, if the effect 
of the financial crisis is to reduce income from a secondary activity, this will not be reflected in 
the wages or income figures reported. Conversely, if the crisis forces people to increase hours in 
a secondary job to compensate for reduced income in their primary job, our results will not 
capture this. Qualitative work gives some support to the idea that there was an increase in 
portfolio working or livelihood diversification (Hastuti et al., 2010). We, therefore, have a 
significant limitation in our ability to assess changes in average wages and average incomes since 
around 14% of working individuals have a secondary job and individuals with a secondary job 
typically spend just over a quarter of their working hours on this job.  However, because we 
know hours worked in the secondary job, it is possible to assess the extent of the bias by 
observing whether secondary working activity is being substituted for main work. 
 
Nominal income and wages are adjusted for inflation using CPI deflators for each province.  
We follow Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) by calculating provincial deflators by mapping the 
66 cities in which the Statistics Indonesia collect price data to the 33 provinces using 
population weighted averages.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11We report measures using the Statistics Indonesia definitions—results using the ILO definitions are available on 
request. 
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V. RESULTS 
 
School Enrollment and Attendance  
 
One of the key concerns when a crisis hits is that it will result in children being withdrawn from 
school. This issue was extensively studied for the Indonesian crisis in 1997/1998—Frankenberg et 
al. (1999) found an increase in the percentage of 13–19 year olds not currently enrolled in school 
between 1997 and 1998. The percentage of 7–12 year olds that have dropped out of school also 
tripled. However, Cameron (2001), using a survey of 100 villages, found only a slight drop in 
school enrollment and Levine and Ames (2003) found that, overall, enrollments were stable or 
increasing, despite substantial cuts in household expenditure on education. 
 
The qualitative study described above suggested that the households in the sampled kabupaten 
had not withdrawn their children from school. However, it is possible that this may simply 
reflect the overall income levels of the people in these villages or their attitudes towards 
education. Fortunately, the Sakernas datasets record information for all individuals in the 
household aged 10 and above, including whether they have never gone to school, are in 
school, or have finished school. We therefore used this to calculate the share of children of 
each age from 10–17 who are no longer in school, as well as the share that were in school last 
week.  Table 2 reports the results. 
 
Table 2 shows that, for most age cohorts, there was either no change in school enrollment 
between February 2008 and February 2009 or an improvement (for 13 and 14 years olds).  
These figures are consistent with the statistically significant improvements in the share of the 
cohort who were in school the previous week. However, breaking down the results for boys 
and girls provides a slight note of caution. The share of girls no longer in school increased 
from February 2008 to August 2008, although by February 2009 the share was insignificantly 
different from that of the previous year. Similarly both female and overall attendance fell from 
February to August 2008. A possible explanation for this would be if households badly 
affected by the strong food price rises during 2008 tended to withdraw their girls temporarily 
from school to help with household management, but, as food price inflation fell markedly 
towards the end of 2008, had put them back into school by February 2009. 
 
Table 2. School Enrollment and Attendance by Age and Gender 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
Note: Asterisks in Aug-08 column indicate statistically significant changes from Feb-08 column; Asterisks in Feb-09 column 
indicate statistically significant changes from Feb-08 column, i.e., from one cohort to the next. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
No Longer in School In School Last Week 
Age and Gender 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 
10 0.008 0.006 0.005** 0.987 0.988 0.990 
11 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.983 0.981 0.986 
12 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.958 0.956 0.959 
13 0.079 0.070* 0.065** 0.915 0.919 0.928** 
14 0.131 0.110*** 0.112** 0.860 0.879*** 0.881*** 
15 0.201 0.200 0.191 0.791 0.786 0.800 
16 0.279 0.287 0.275 0.712 0.698 0.713 
17 0.386 0.408** 0.386 0.602 0.575*** 0.605 
Male 0.157 0.154 0.149 0.836 0.834 0.844* 
Female 0.135 0.144** 0.137 0.857 0.845*** 0.856 
Total (10–17) 0.146 0.149 0.143 0.846 0.839** 0.850 
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Our description of the macroeconomic context above suggests that some sectors were worse 
hit than others. In particular, sectors dependent on commodities (e.g., mining), export-
oriented industry, as well as the trade, hotel, and restaurant sectors appear to have suffered the 
worst effects of this crisis. However, Table 3, which shows school enrollment by the sector of 
employment of the household head, suggests that there were no clear changes in enrollment 
or attendance by sector. The only exception is that the children in households in which the 
head was in the construction sector were less likely to be in school in August 2008 than in 
February 2008, but this effect vanished by the following February. 
 
Table 3. School Enrollment and Attendance by Sector of Household Head 
No Longer in School In School Last Week 
Sector of Household Head 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 
Agriculture, Plant, Forest, Hunt 0.194 0.193 0.186 0.797 0.794 0.804 
Mining and Quarrying 0.151 0.186 0.145 0.841 0.802 0.845 
Industry 0.136 0.130 0.133 0.853 0.859 0.864 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.090 0.073 0.052 0.910 0.904 0.948 
Construction 0.133 0.147 0.126 0.860 0.839** 0.869 
Trade, Hotel, and Restaurant  0.122 0.124 0.120 0.871 0.866 0.873 
Transport, Storage, and 
Communication  0.109 0.116 0.107 0.883 0.875 0.886 
Financial Inst, Real Estate 0.067 0.075 0.072 0.930 0.915 0.915 
Social Services, Social & Personal 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.921 0.917 0.922 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
Note: Asterisks in Aug-08 column indicate statistically significant changes from Feb-08 column; Asterisks in Feb-09 column 
indicate statistically significant changes from Feb-08 column, i.e., from one cohort to the next. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
 
 
Labor Force Participation, Unemployment, and Hours Worked 
 
In 1997/98 there was a sharp increase in labor force participation among women and a small 
increase in participation overall (Manning, 2000). Frankenberg et al. (1999) also reported little 
evidence of change in aggregate, in participation or hours of work, although they also find 
considerably higher proportions of women working in 1998 relative to 1997.  Similarly, Levine 
and Ames (2003) found an increase in the labor force participation of female heads of over 
10% between 1997 and 1999.   
 
In the current crisis, it is therefore interesting to see that there is no statistically significant 
change in labor force participation for men or women (Table 4). There are small increases in 
participation for older workers, but the main finding is the large falls in participation for 
children. Participation in labor force for workers aged between 12 and 14 fell by between 
17% and 24%, year on year. Participation for those aged 15–17 declined by 9%. This, 
combined with the increases in enrollment and attendance found above, suggests that 
families may have responded to the current crisis by keeping their children in school rather 
than by removing them. 
 
The changes in unemployment are also revealing. In the 1997/98 crisis, unemployment 
increased only slightly, with the increase greatest amongst female workers aged 15–24 and 
younger rural males (Manning, 2000). For the current crisis, we find a sharp contrast between 
younger and older workers. Unemployment rates have risen for workers aged under 25 and 
are particularly high for children under 15 in August 2008.  The latter undoubtedly reflects the 
influence of recent school leavers and may also help to explain falling participation and rising 
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enrollment—there is no point in leaving school if you are unlikely to get a job. By contrast, 
unemployment rates have been falling for workers between the ages of 25 and 55 and there is 
evidence for a small decrease in overall female unemployment. 
 
In keeping with the findings from the previous crisis, we find very little change in hours of 
work. There is some evidence for increases in hours of work of younger workers between 
February and August 2008, but no clear evidence for major reductions in working hours 
caused by falling labor demand or, conversely, of people increasing their working hours to 
compensate for lost income. However, we would expect these effects to be sectorally 
concentrated. Table 5 presents the share of employment by sector as well as the hours of 
work.  Had the crisis had a major impact on employment in any sector we would expect to see 
the share of employment of that sector shrinking. However, we find no evidence for this. The 
only sector where employment falls is in agriculture, but this effect is seasonal; employment in 
construction also rises in August for the same reason. There is also little support for the idea 
that hours of work fell in key-affected sectors.  There are no statistically significant changes in 
hours worked between February 2008 and February 2009. Again, the small changes in hours 
worked in agriculture, construction, and social and personal services between February and 
August 2008 are likely to be seasonal. 
 
Although we see little change in the sectoral allocation of jobs, it is possible that the financial 
crisis pushed out some workers into the informal sector. Table 6 shows the share of workers 
by different categories of work as well as their hours worked.12 
 
Consistent with the story of increasing informality, there is an increase in the share of workers 
that own their single-person business, as well as in the share of workers doing casual 
nonagricultural work.  However, both of these changes happen between February and August 
2008—over the full year there is no significant increase in the share of workers in the informal 
sector. The changes in hours worked are also small and mostly seasonal, although hours spent 
by unpaid workers and owner of businesses with nonpermanent or unpaid workers increased 
slightly over the year. 
 
                                                 
12Cuevas et al. (n.d.) define formality as the first four of these categories and informality as the last three.  
However, in practice, most single-handed businesses in Indonesia are informal in the sense that very few are 
registered or have formal business licenses (see The Asia Foundation, 2008). We therefore include these in our 
definition of informality. 
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Table 4. Participation, Unemployment, and Hours of Work by Age and Gender 
Participation Unemployment Hours of Work 
Age and Gender 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 
10 0.015 0.015   0.013   0.065 0.148 ** 0.066   15.201 17.226   17.785 
11 0.031 0.023 *** 0.025   0.051 0.138 *** 0.095   15.038 18.482   14.51 
12 0.057 0.040 *** 0.043 *** 0.079 0.109   0.052   17.372 18.681   19.11 
13 0.090 0.066 *** 0.070 *** 0.078 0.151 *** 0.090   20.173 22.903   20.831 
14 0.133 0.102 *** 0.111 *** 0.130 0.142   0.132   24.362 26.272   23.639 
15-17 0.263 0.242 *** 0.238 *** 0.211 0.249 *** 0.223   33.257 35.702 *** 33.736 
18-25 0.643 0.659 *** 0.648   0.198 0.216 *** 0.214 *** 41.129 41.909 *** 41.332 
26-35 0.754 0.753   0.757   0.087 0.082 * 0.082 * 42.556 42.788   42.567 
36-45 0.798 0.793   0.796   0.051 0.036 *** 0.043 *** 42.216 42.326   42.152 
46-55 0.777 0.790 *** 0.801 *** 0.023 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 40.395 40.55   40.354 
56+ 0.543 0.530 *** 0.549   0.008 0.013 *** 0.008   34.77 35.228   35.077 
Male (15+) 0.836 0.835   0.836   0.079 0.076 ** 0.077   42.099 42.614   42.053 
Female (15+) 0.512 0.511   0.518   0.093 0.097 * 0.088 * 37.61 38.028   38.023 
Total (15+) 0.673 0.672   0.676   0.085 0.084   0.081 * 40.398 40.885   40.512 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
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Table 5. Share of Employment and Hours Worked by Sector 
Share of Employment Hours of Work 
Sector of the Individual 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 
Agriculture 0.421 0.405 *** 0.414   32.4 33.2 *** 32.6 
Mining and Quarrying 0.010 0.010   0.011   45.2 44.2   44.0 
Industry 0.122 0.122   0.120   43.8 43.7   43.6 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.002 0.002   0.002   42.6 44.0   42.8 
Construction 0.046 0.053 *** 0.044   46.0 47.0 * 45.8 
Trade, Hotel, and Restaurant 0.203 0.207   0.209 * 49.3 49.3   48.9 
Transport, Storage, and Communication 0.058 0.060   0.056   48.4 49.1   48.9 
Financial Inst, Real Estate 0.014 0.014   0.014   44.1 42.9   43.0 
Social Services, Social & Personal 0.124 0.127   0.130 ** 43.0 42.0 *** 43.3 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
 
 
Table 6. Share of Workers and Hours Worked by Work Category 
Share Of Workers Hours Worked 
Category of Work 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 
Own business 0.195 0.203 *** 0.198 42.1 43.2 *** 41.8   
Business owners with 
nonpermanent or unpaid workers 0.209 0.210   0.205 39.8 40.0   40.4 ** 
Business owners with permanent 
or paid workers 0.029 0.029   0.028 45.4 46.1   45.5   
Employee 0.277 0.273   0.275 46.4 46.0 ** 46.2   
Casual work agriculture 0.060 0.058   0.061 34.7 36.2 *** 34.5   
Casual work nonagriculture 0.047 0.051 *** 0.049 44.0 44.3   43.3   
Unpaid work 0.183 0.175 *** 0.184 30.4 31.0 *** 31.1 *** 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
**5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
 
 
Wage and Income Changes 
 
The overriding story of the 1997/1998 crisis in Indonesia was of collapsing real wages. 
Manning (2000) shows that the evidence strongly supports a neoclassical view of the labor 
market, with little change in employment but large reductions in real wages. This phenomenon 
is not unique to Indonesia. McKenzie (2004) shows that Argentina also suffered from large 
falls in real wages across all sectors in the wake of the 2002 financial crisis there.   
 
The Sakernas data from the current crisis provide strong support for the idea that labor markets 
in Indonesia are highly flexible, but this time in an upwards direction. Table 7 shows real and 
nominal wages for employees by age category and gender, while Table 8 provides the same 
information by sector. The data suggest that there was a large increase in average real wages 
between February 2008 and February 2009. The average real wage increased by 11%.  Moreover, 
this increase occurred entirely between August 2008 and February 2009, precisely the period 
spanning the onset of the global financial crisis in Indonesia. It is interesting to note that the 
only age group who did not benefit from this increase was young workers below the age of 25. 
These are precisely the workers whom the qualitative evidence would suggest were hardest hit, 
both by contract termination and reduction in overtime and other benefits; however, the data 
suggest that, at least on average, even these workers saw no decline in their real wage. 
 
Breaking down these real wages changes by sector shows that these wages increases were not 
uniform. Mining and quarrying in particular—the sector is most likely to be negatively affected 
by falling commodity prices—saw a significant 9% drop in real wages.  But most other sectors 
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saw an increase. Real wages in industry rose by 9%, those in construction by 12% and those in 
the transport and communications sector by a remarkable 23%. 
 
The large increase in real wages for employees does not necessarily mean increases in real 
income for all categories of workers. Table 9 shows the real wages and incomes for all 
categories of workers. Those owning their own single-person business saw a significant 
increase in their real income between February and August 2008, but this fell markedly 
between August 2008 and February 2009, leaving no statistically significant increase over the 
year. A similar pattern prevailed for casual workers both in agriculture and in nonagriculture, 
with none of the nonemployee categories of workers experiencing a statistically significant 
increase in real income over the year.  Thus there would appear to be a widening gap between 
employees in the formal sector and workers running single-person businesses or undertaking 
casual work.   
 
Although the macroeconomic evidence suggests that Indonesia was not hit hard by the 
financial crisis, the collapses in exports and commodity prices over the last quarter of 2008 
were far from trivial. It is therefore extremely surprising to see such large increases in real 
wages. These results are not driven by outliers—a 1% trimmed sample produces much the 
same pattern of results. Moreover, it appears to be true across the wage and income 
distribution in the sense that the same pattern emerges if one looks at median wages/income 
or the lower or upper quartile.13 One possibility may be that the higher inflation of mid-2008 
led to demands for higher nominal wages.  If formal sector employment contracts are decided 
after August but before the onset of the crisis in October, then employers may have agreed to 
relatively large nominal wage increases. But, as noted above, the collapse in commodity and 
world food prices led to a rapid reduction in domestic inflation, greatly increasing the value of 
any nominal wage increases given.   
 
Another possible explanation for the increase in average wages may be that there are 
compositional changes in the workforce. Specifically, it may be the case that employers used 
the crisis as an opportunity to release lower paid workers, thereby increasing the average wage.  
Table 4 indicated that employment fell most amongst young workers, who earn around two-
thirds of the national average wage. Moreover, employers may have removed the less skilled 
workers in each age class. Figure 1 provides some support for this idea. It shows total 
employment by education attainment for all three years. It is clear that employment is lower in 
February 2009 for those with only primary or junior secondary schooling, whereas it is higher 
for those who have completed senior secondary school. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13With the exception that income from single-person businesses increases by 14% from February 2008 to February 
2009 at the median, but barely changes for the lower and upper quartile suggesting a narrowing of the distribution. 
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Table 7. Nominal and Real Wages by Age and Gender 
Percentage Changes 
Real Wage (Rupiah per month) Nominal Wage (Rupiah per month) 
Real Wages Nominal Wages Age and 
Gender 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08–Aug-08 
Feb-08–
Feb-09 
Feb-08–
Aug-08 
Feb-08–
Feb-09 
15-17 469,651 470,892 487,492   493,976 502,855   529,973   0% 4% 2% 7% 
18-25 724,545 700,371 766,104   761,080 747,424   831,871   -3% 6% -2% 9% 
26-35 1,005,889 998,353 1,079,065 * 1,056,669 1,065,434   1,171,276 *** -1% 7% 1% 11% 
36-45 1,311,045 1,332,889 1,465,920 *** 1,377,236 1,423,376   1,591,641 *** 2% 12% 3% 16% 
46-55 1,608,741 1,641,481 1,789,487 *** 1,689,170 1,752,972   1,943,712 *** 2% 11% 4% 15% 
56+ 1,243,424 1,216,640 1,497,141 ** 1,305,101 1,298,746   1,623,825 ** -2% 20% 0% 24% 
Male 1,162,348 1,173,385 1,293,014 *** 1,221,163 1,252,976   1,404,218 *** 1% 11% 3% 15% 
Female 886,075 909,449 984,577 *** 930,151 970,307   1,068,290 *** 3% 11% 4% 15% 
Total 1,070,200 1,082,360 1,190,994 *** 1,124,099 1,155,490 * 1,293,105 *** 1% 11% 3% 15% 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
 
Table 8. Nominal and Real Wages by Sector 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
Percentage Changes 
Real Wage (Rupiah per month '000s) Nominal Wage (Rupiah per month '000s) 
Real Wage Nominal Wages Sector of the Individual 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-08–Aug-08 
Feb-08–
Feb-09 
Feb-08–
Aug-08 
Feb-08–
Feb-09 
Agriculture 717,624 795,119 *** 723,491   756,034 851,767 *** 788,112   11% 1% 13% 4% 
Mining and Quarrying 2,015,396 2,102,264   1,840,817 *** 2,125,965 2,258,565 * 2,015,873   4% -9% 6% -5% 
Industry 920,908 869,769 *** 1,002,005 *** 966,614 927,115 ** 1,085,574 *** -6% 9% -4% 12% 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 1,848,231 1,767,199   1,806,329   1,941,746 1,888,439   1,959,084   -4% -2% -3% 1% 
Construction 1,084,087 1,024,250 * 1,218,448 *** 1,138,929 1,093,257   1,324,231 *** -6% 12% -4% 16% 
Trade, Hotel, and Restaurant 902,201 914,102   955,810 ** 946,907 974,677   1,035,862 *** 1% 6% 3% 9% 
Transport, Stor., and Comm. 1,273,183 1,277,662   1,569,649 *** 1,337,079 1,362,912   1,703,966 *** 0% 23% 2% 27% 
Financial Inst, Real Estate 1,744,726 1,652,934 ** 1,831,938 ** 1,830,455 1,761,249   1,984,687 *** -5% 5% -4% 8% 
Social Services, Social & Pers. 1,181,987 1,246,432 *** 1,344,543 *** 1,241,538 1,331,335 *** 1,461,161 *** 5% 14% 7% 18% 
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Table 9. Real wages/Income by Work Category 
Real Income/Real Wage Category of Work 
Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 
Own business 706,257 825,304 *** 722,141   
Business owners with nonpermanent or unpaid 
workers           
Business owners with permanent or paid workers           
Employee 1,070,200 1,082,360   1,190,994 *** 
Casual work agriculture 362,462 385,016   357,935   
Casual work nonagriculture 588,261 607,836   562,252   
Unpaid work           
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
Note: Real wage is reported for employees; real income is reported for other categories. The question on income/wages 
was not asked for the shaded rows.  
***1% significance level. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Employment by education attainment 
 
 
Reasons for Ending Employment 
 
Even though unemployment is falling and wages are rising, it may still be the case that the 
financial crisis has caused reductions in the demand for particular types of worker. If this is 
the case we would expect to see that a larger share of workers that have recently stopped 
working did so because of labor demand reasons (e.g. being fired or made redundant, or the 
firm that they were working for downsizing or going bankrupt as a result of a drop in 
demand) relative to labor supply reasons (e.g., the workers disliking the pay or conditions of 
employment). Table 10 shows the change in the reasons for finishing a job between August 
2008 and February 2009.14 
 
 
                                                 
14Unfortunately, the question was not asked in February 2008. 
 The SMERU Research Institute 17
Table 10. Reasons for Ending Employment 
Reason for Ending Work/Changing Job Aug-08 Feb-09 
Fired/Made redundant 0.050 0.060 *** 
No demand or firm went bankrupt 0.141 0.177 *** 
Income too low 0.205 0.195 * 
Unsuitable work environment 0.093 0.094   
Contract finished 0.157 0.165   
Other 0.353 0.310 *** 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
*10% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
 
Consistent with our expectations, there is a statistically significant increase in the share of workers 
ending work or changing job as a result of being fired or made redundant, and a large increase in 
the share of those doing so because of firms scaling down or going bankrupt. On the other hand, 
there is a small decrease in those leaving jobs because they were dissatisfied with the income.  
Thus labor demand reasons for quits appear to dominate during the period of the financial crisis. 
 
Focusing on those who have ended work or changed their jobs is also likely to be a much more 
sensitive indicator of the impact of the crisis on different sectors. Table 11 shows, for each sector, 
the share of workers ending work or changing jobs as a result of reductions in labor demand (i.e., the 
sum of workers being fired/made redundant and a drop in demand or firm bankruptcy). The large 
increase in this share, particularly for both mining and industry, suggests that the job losses that did 
occur were increasingly driven by reductions in the labor demand due to the crisis. 
 
Table 11. Changes in Termination due to Falling Demand by Sector 
Redundant or No demand 
Sector of the Individual 
Aug-08 Feb-09 
Agriculture, Plant, Forest, Hunt 0.230 0.274 *** 
Mining and Quarrying 0.116 0.232 *** 
Industry 0.247 0.307 *** 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.131 0.145   
Construction 0.258 0.342 *** 
Trade, Hotel, and Restaurant 0.168 0.161   
Transport, Storage, and Communication 0.139 0.185 ** 
Financial Inst, Real Estate 0.098 0.119   
Social Services, Social & Personal 0.082 0.118 *** 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
**5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
The description statistics presented above provide a valuable picture of the impact of the 
crisis. However, they do not control for the wide variety of individual, household and 
locational characteristics which can influence schooling and labor force outcomes. To account 
for these we follow Levine and Ames (2003) and estimate regressions of our outcomes against 
these characteristics.  Because Sakernas is not designed as a panel, it is not possible to explore 
the determinants of job entry and exit.  Instead, we interact dummy variables for August 2008 
and February 2009 with gender, sector, and rural/urban location. We can therefore determine 
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whether the influence of gender, sector, and location on our variables of interest have changed 
over the period. 
 
Table A1 shows the results for school enrollment. We obtain common results on the 
determinants of school dropouts: older children are more likely to drop out, as are those from 
larger households with high dependency ratios, and those living in rural areas. Boys are more 
likely to drop out than girls, although the effect is very small. Similarly there is little to 
distinguish the dropout rates among households whose head works in different sectors, 
although children in households headed by casual workers, particularly in agriculture, are more 
likely to drop out. Unsurprisingly the educational achievements of the household head and 
spouse have a strong influence on dropout rates. Even after controlling for all of these factors, 
we see large differences in the dropout rates among different provinces.   
 
However, our key variable of interest is the wave variable. Here the general result obtained from 
the descriptive statistics is confirmed; there is no statistically significant change in the number of 
children no longer in school across the three waves of the survey. Column 2 of Table A1 shows 
the same regression with interaction effects for age. These results suggest that the probability of no 
longer being in school rises by almost 1% in August 2008 for children aged 17, but falls by the 
same amount for children aged 10.  For February 2009, the differences are even smaller. In effect, 
there is virtually no change in school dropouts across the waves. 
 
Levine and Ames (2003) were particularly concerned to explore the impact on girls during the 
1997/1998 crisis. Column 3 therefore shows the interaction with gender. Again we find no 
change in school dropouts across the waves, except for a very small (0.5 of a percentage point) 
increase in the probability of girls being no longer in school in August 2008, but this 
disappears in February 2009. Column 4 reports interactions with sector of the household 
head. In general, the sector of the household head does not appear to have any significant 
impact on the small declines in the share of children no longer in school in August 2008 and 
February 2009. The only significant result (at the 10% level) is an increase in the probability of 
dropping out of school for those children who live in households whose head works in the 
transportation, storage, or communication sector in August 2008, although the significance of 
this result disappears in February 2009. Finally, column 5 shows interaction terms with rural 
or urban location. These suggest a small increase in school dropouts by February 2009 for 
those in urban areas, while the share no longer in school continued to decline in rural areas.  
Very similar results were obtained when looking at the share of children in school last week, 
rather than the share of children no longer in school.15 
 
Looking at labor force participation, we again find a range of standard (and large) influences 
on labor force participation: participation increases with age and education; men are much 
more likely to participate than women; and those in living in urban areas as well as those in 
large households with high dependency ratios are less likely to be in the labor force (Table 
A2). Contrary to our descriptive analysis, our regression results suggest a small overall 
reduction in participation in both August 2008 and February 2009 relative to February 2008.  
Column 2 of Table A2 confirms the earlier finding that the reduction in labor force 
participation is stronger for younger workers; and column 3 confirms that there is no 
difference in the rates of change of participation between male and female workers.  Column 5 
shows that rural participation fell by more than 2 percentage points in August 2008, but this 
was probably seasonal since there was no difference in the small overall reduction in 
participation between rural and urban areas by February 2009. 
                                                 
15Results are available on request. 
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Turning to unemployment, we find that the probability of being unemployed increases with 
household size and with education. Women are more likely to be unemployed than men, while 
older workers and households with a higher dependency ratio are less likely to be unemployed 
(Table A3). After accounting for these characteristics, we find that there is no statistically 
significant change in unemployment between February 2008 and either August 2008 or February 
2009. When the age interaction term is included (column 2), we see a confirmation of the earlier 
finding that unemployment may have increased for younger workers, but declined for older 
workers. The gap between male and female unemployment increased in August 2008 but 
narrowed during the crisis. Also the gap in unemployment between people living in urban areas and 
those in rural areas closed both for August 2008 and February 2009, but this result is not significant.   
 
Finally, looking at the reasons why people had left their previous work (Table A4), we find that a 
higher proportion of older workers left their previous work because they were made redundant or 
the firm in which they worked went bankrupt. Similarly, urban households, compared to rural 
ones, are significantly more likely to have ended their employment due to a fall in labor demand. 
Women and those who had achieved a higher level of education were less likely to cite these 
reasons. In terms of sectors people were more likely to cite they were made redundant or went 
bankrupt if they previously worked in industry or construction whereas those working in finance, 
transport, trade, or social services were less likely to cite these reasons. Our results also confirm 
that there was a significant increase in these two cited reasons for ending employment in February 
2009 in comparison to August 2008. The only significant result of the interaction terms, which is 
perhaps unexpected, is that those working in the financial sector saw a decrease in the share of 
people citing that they were made redundant or went bankrupt. 
 
Table 12. Comparing the Qualitative and Quantitative Results 
 Qualitative (Feb 2009) Quantitative (Feb-08, Aug-08, and 
Feb-09) 
School 
enrollment/attendance 
No change, but some arrears in 
payment 
Generally no change or continued 
improvement for 13/14 year olds.  But 
possible evidence for seasonal withdrawal 
in August for girls and 17 year olds. 
No sector specific changes. 
Female labor participation No change No change 
Child labor No change Significant falls in the participation of 
12–17 year olds in the labor force 
Unemployment Increase for young migrant industrial 
workers; and workers associated with 
the rubber industry 
Rising for 15–25 year olds; falling for 
25–55 year olds 
Hours of work Reduced for contract workers Virtually no significant changes by 
age or sector 
Informality Some suggestions of increased 
informality 
Evidence for increased own business 
and casual nonagricultural work in 
2008, but little overall change 
Wages and Income Large falls in take home pay for 
contract workers; reductions in 
income for local businesses 
Significant and large increases in real 
wages for employees; but little change 
in incomes in the informal sector 
Source: Fillaili et al. (2009) and the current study. 
 
Comparing Qualitative and Quantitative Results 
 
Finally, it is instructive to briefly compare the results which were obtained from the rapid 
qualitative study with the results that we obtain (Table 12). It is important to recognize that 
the qualitative study made no claims for national representativeness, so this exercise should in 
no way be considered a “verification” of its results. Its aim was to provide a rich and 
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informative portrait of what had happened in two specific locations and no Sakernas dataset is 
sufficiently detailed to provide meaningful results at the village level.  However, given that the 
powerful stories provided by qualitative studies often inform the thinking of national 
policymakers, it is interesting to note the way in which the two approaches inform each 
other’s work. 
 
Three Features Strike Us about the Results of the Two Studies 
 
First, despite the small, purposively selected sample for the qualitative study, the overall 
conclusions which are drawn about there being little change in both schooling and 
participation in the labor force are broadly similar to those obtained from the national data.   
 
Second, the qualitative study highlighted the specific vulnerability of younger workers in an 
urban setting. This corresponds well with our results which show increasing unemployment 
and no increase in wages for workers under 25. The qualitative study also points to potential 
weaknesses in the way in which the labor force survey surveys migrant workers, which may 
explain why our results do not show a stronger negative impact for this group. 
 
Finally, studies (whether qualitative or quantitative) which purposively select areas which are 
likely to have been negatively affected by a shock, inevitably tend to miss potential gainers 
from that shock. None of the many interviews and discussions carried out in the two selected 
villages gave any indication of large real wage increases for employees. This may well be 
because this did not happen in these two locations as a result of the larger shock that they 
received; however, the national data provide strong evidence for such increases.   
 
We, therefore, find the approaches quite complementary. Each approach helps to identify gaps in 
the other as well as to identify hypotheses which can be better explored with the other approach.  
 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Indonesia has weathered the financial crisis of 2008/2009 reasonably well. The macroeconomic 
shock it suffered was much less than those of neighboring countries and merely served to slow 
its already respectable growth rate. Nonetheless, the nature of the shock—acting through 
dramatically reduced exports and large declines in commodity prices—would lead us to expect 
some strong localized effects. In fact, we find very little evidence of subgroups which have been 
particularly badly affected.  The share of children dropping out of school stayed the same or 
continued to improve, with only small differences by gender, age, and rural/urban location. 
Labor force participation fell, particularly for children; it would seem that parents kept children 
in school as the labor market deteriorated for younger workers. But, as unemployment rose for 
workers between 18 and 25, it continued to fall for workers above this age. Average hours 
worked remained roughly the same and there was no evidence for significant sectoral shifts in 
employment. While it is clear that labor demand reductions have become a much more 
important reason for ending or changing job, the continued fall in aggregate unemployment 
suggests that these redundancies have been absorbed within normal labor turnover and the crisis 
does not seem to have altered the share of workers in the informal sector. 
 
The big surprise from our analysis is what has happened to real wages for employees. In a 
reversal of the experience of the 1997/98 crisis, where adjustment was achieved through a 
substantial fall in real wages, the period between August 2008 and February 2009 saw large 
increases in real wages for employees over 25. Although real wages in mining fell, reflecting 
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the collapse in commodity prices, wages in industry, construction, and transport and 
communications increased quickly.  However, it was employees that primarily gained; workers 
in the informal sector, whether operating single-handed enterprises or casual workers, did not 
see significant increases.  
 
There are a number of reasons why Indonesia may have come out of this financial crisis 
reasonably well. The first is structural. Indonesia, as a large country, is much less dependent 
on international trade than many other countries in Southeast Asia. The large drop in exports 
and imports, therefore, had a commensurately smaller effect on the domestic economy. In 
addition, the government’s macroeconomic management of this crisis appears to have been 
good. Arrangements were made rapidly to provide confidence to the market, limiting the fall 
in the value of the currency, and hastening its early recovery. This minimized the impact on 
import-dependent firms and avoided major shifts in resources between the tradeable and 
nontradeable sectors.   
 
The nature of our data, however, can say little about the welfare impact of the crisis. The large 
increase in real wages may have protected employees during the highly volatile period between 
August 2008 and February 2009, but the informal sector was less well-protected. Moreover, 
our data cannot identify the impact of the various government social programs—put in place 
in response to the crisis—which may have ameliorated the situation for selected groups.  
Ongoing qualitative and quantitative research should shed light on these issues (Hastuti et al., 
2010; World Bank, 2010). 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Indonesian experience may have some useful broader 
lessons about the impact of the crisis. First, the nature of the shock was relatively narrowly 
focused on export sectors, particularly commodities and manufacturing. This poses a policy 
challenge, since it was engagement with the world market in these sectors that was driving 
growth prior to the crisis. Countries with large domestic markets, such as Indonesia, may be 
able to reduce their vulnerability to such shocks through boosting domestic demand, but this 
is not an option for smaller developing countries. Second, Indonesia’s policy environment and 
responses to the crisis would appear to provide a positive example of how to deal with such 
shocks. Careful monetary management prevented a long-lasting shock to the exchange rate, 
while a long period of prudential budget management had created the fiscal space for 
Indonesia to respond. At the same time, relatively flexible labor markets meant that affected 
firms could shed temporary labor rapidly, preventing widespread corporate failures as 
occurred during the East Asian crisis.   
 
Third, Indonesia’s experience suggests some priorities which have also emerged from studies 
of the impact of the crisis in other countries (e.g., Oxfam, 2010). These include the 
importance of food prices, the impact on migrant workers, and the need to understand the 
informal sector better. The qualitative work strongly suggests that the persistence of high food 
prices is the single most important influence on the welfare of the poor, and that therefore the 
run-up in food prices during 2008 may have had a much stronger impact than the financial 
crisis itself. The disconnect between the qualitative findings of strong negative impacts on 
migrant workers and the lack of major negative impact on workers in our dataset highlight the 
fact that labor force surveys often omit precisely the group that may be most negatively 
affected. Similarly, the difference between the fortunes of formal sector workers and those in 
the informal sector points to the need to understand much better the ways in which the 
informal sector is affected by such crises.  Developing the tools to improve our understanding 
of these issues could enable governments to provide better responses to future crises. 
 The SMERU Research Institute 22
REFERENCES 
 
 
Asia Foundation (2008). Making Sense of Business Licensing in Indonesia. Jakarta:  
The Asia Foundation. 
Cameron, Lisa A. (2001). 'The Impact of the Indonesian Financial Crisis on Children: An Analysis 
using the 100 Villages Data.' Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 37(1): 43–64. 
Colledge, M. (2009). Crisis Monitoring and Response System (CMRS) Design and 
Development: Review and Recommendations. Jakarta. 
Cuevas, Sining, Christian Mina, Marissa Barcenas, dan Aleli Rosario (n.d.) Informal 
Employment in Indonesia. A. D. Bank. Manila. 
Fillaili, Rizki, Widjajanti I. Suharyo, Bambang Sulaksono, Hastuti, Sri Budiyati, dan Syaikhu 
Usman (2009). 'IDS Pilot Qualitative Study: Crisis Impact and Response.  Indonesia 
Country Report.' Draft Report. Jakarta, The SMERU Research Institute. 
Frankenberg, Elizabeth, Duncan Thomas, dan Kathleen Beegle (1999). 'The Real Cost of 
Indonesia's Economic Crisis: Preliminary Findings from the Indonesian Family Life 
Surveys.' Labor and Population Program Working Paper Series Rand Corporation 
Publications Department. 
Friedman, Jed dan James Levinsohn (2002). 'The Distributional Impact of Indonesia's 
Financial Crisis on Household Welfare: A "Rapid Response" Methodology.'  
The World Bank Economic Review 16(3): 397–423. 
Griffith-Jones, Stephany dan José Antonio Ocampo (2009). 'The Financial Crisis and Its 
Impact on Developing Countries.' Working Paper No. 53. Brasilia, DF:  
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, UNDP. 
Hastuti, Syaikhu Usman, M. Sulton Mawardi, Justin Sodo, Deswanto Marbun, and 
Ruhmaniyati (2010). Peran Program Perlindungan Sosial dalam Meredam Dampak 
Krisis Keuangan Global 2008/09 [The Role of Social Protection in Ameliorating the 
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 2008/2009], Research Report, Jakarta:  
The SMERU Research Institute. 
Hossain, Naomi dan Rosalind Eyben (2009). 'Accounts of Crisis: Poor People’s Experiences 
of the Food, Fuel and Financial Crises in Five Countries.' Report. Brighton:  
Institute of Development Studies. 
IMF (2009). 'The Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Low-Income Countries.' 
Paper. International Monetary Fund. 
Kanbur, Ravi (ed.). (2003). Q-squared: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Poverty 
Appraisal. New Delhi: Permanent Black. 
Levine, David dan Minnie Ames (2003). 'Gender Bias and the Indonesian Financial Crisis: 
Were Girls Hit Hardest?' Center for International and Development Economics 
Research Paper C03-130. Berkeley: University of California  
 The SMERU Research Institute 23
Manning, Chris (2000). 'Labour Market Adjustment to Indonesia's Economic Crisis: Context, 
Trends and Implications.' Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 36(1): 105–136. 
McKenzie, David (2004). 'Aggregate Shocks and Labour Market Responses: Evidence from 
Argentina's Financial Crisis.' Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 (4): 719–58. 
Mendoza, Ronald U. (2009). 'Aggregate Shocks, Poor Households and Children.'  
Global Social Policy 9(1): 55–78. 
Naude, Wim. (2009). 'The Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Developing Countries.' Discussion 
Paper No. 2009/01. Helsinki: United Nations University-World Institute for 
Development Economics Research. 
ODI (2009). 'The Global Financial Crisis and Developing Countries: Preliminary Synthesis of 
Ten Draft Country Reports.' London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Suryadarma, Daniel, Asep Suryahadi, and Sudarno Sumarto (2005). 'The Measurement and 
Trends of Unemployment in Indonesia: The Issue of Discouraged Workers.' 
Working Paper. Jakarta: The SMERU Research Institute. 
Statistics Indonesia (1996). National Labor Force Survey: Enumerators Manual. Jakarta: The 
Statistics Indonesia. 
World Bank (2009). Indonesia Economic Quarterly: Weathering the Storm. Jakarta: World Bank. 
World Bank (2009). 'Swimming against the Tide: How Developing Countries Are Coping with 
the Global Financial Crisis.' Background Paper prepared by World Bank Staff for the 
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting. Horsham, United 
Kingdom on March 13–14, 2009. World Bank. 
World Bank (2010). 'Indonesia’s Crisis Monitoring and Response System (CMRS).'  Mimeo. 
Jakarta: World Bank. 
Yudo, Teguh, Ira S. Titiheruw dan Hadi Soesastro (2009) ‘Impacts of Global Financial Crisis 
on Indonesian Economy.’ Research Report for The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), September. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS). 
 
 The SMERU Research Institute 24
APPENDICES 
 
 
Table A1: Determinants of Being No Longer in School 
   MARGINAL EFFECT (DP/DX)     
Independent Variables Wave Wave (age) Wave (gender) Wave (sector) Wave (urban) 
            
age 0.0890*** 0.0879*** 0.0890*** 0.0889*** 0.0890*** 
 (0.00444) (0.00445) (0.00444) (0.00444) (0.00444) 
age squared -0.00177*** -0.00178*** -0.00177*** -0.00177*** -0.00177*** 
 (0.000159) (0.000159) (0.000159) (0.000159) (0.000159) 
female -0.00551*** -0.00549*** -0.00549*** -0.00975*** -0.00549*** 
 (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00226) (0.00115) 
urban/rural 0.0182*** 0.0182*** 0.0182*** 0.0182*** 0.0147*** 
 (0.00438) (0.00438) (0.00438) (0.00438) (0.00515) 
hhsize 0.00270*** 0.00270*** 0.00270*** 0.00270*** 0.00271*** 
 (0.000393) (0.000392) (0.000393) (0.000392) (0.000392) 
dependency ratio 0.0142*** 0.0141*** 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 
 (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00111) 
household head characteristics 
own business 0.00223 0.00224 0.00224 0.00220 0.00221 
 (0.00227) (0.00226) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) 
bus nonperm/unpaid wrkers 0.00265 0.00263 0.00266 0.00263 0.00265 
 (0.00227) (0.00226) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) 
bus perm/paid wrkers 0.00248 0.00253 0.00253 0.00248 0.00254 
 (0.00361) (0.00361) (0.00361) (0.00361) (0.00361) 
cas work agric 0.0336*** 0.0335*** 0.0336*** 0.0335*** 0.0336*** 
 (0.00446) (0.00446) (0.00447) (0.00446) (0.00446) 
cas wrk non agric 0.0162*** 0.0163*** 0.0162*** 0.0163*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00369) (0.00369) (0.00368) (0.00369) (0.00368) 
unpaid work -0.00159 -0.00161 -0.00173 -0.00159 -0.00172 
 (0.00686) (0.00685) (0.00686) (0.00686) (0.00685) 
Mining 0.00881 0.00873 0.00460 0.00877 0.00884 
 (0.00544) (0.00543) (0.0114) (0.00543) (0.00545) 
Industry -0.000820 -0.000795 -0.000416 -0.000855 -0.000867 
 (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.00470) (0.00267) (0.00266) 
Electricty,Gas & Wat 0.000173 0.000325 0.00235 0.000146 0.000276 
 (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0241) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
Construction -0.00875*** -0.00876*** -0.0120*** -0.00873*** -0.00869*** 
 (0.00269) (0.00268) (0.00424) (0.00269) (0.00269) 
Fin~cl Inst, Real Est -0.0101*** -0.0100*** -0.0129*** -0.0101*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00329) (0.00188) (0.00188) 
Transprt, Stor. & Comm -0.0120*** -0.0119*** -0.0169*** -0.0120*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00383) (0.00239) (0.00239) 
Trade, Hotel, & Restaurant  -0.0168*** -0.0168*** -0.0212** -0.0168*** -0.0168*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00518) (0.0102) (0.00519) (0.00519) 
Social Services -0.0184*** -0.0184*** -0.0198*** -0.0184*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00235) (0.00376) (0.00235) (0.00236) 
female 0.00946*** 0.00945*** 0.00944*** 0.00945*** 0.00948*** 
 (0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00253) 
never been to school 0.0312*** 0.0312*** 0.0312*** 0.0313*** 0.0312*** 
 (0.00372) (0.00372) (0.00372) (0.00373) (0.00372) 
attending primary 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.0152*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00187) 
junior school (SMP) -0.0257*** -0.0256*** -0.0257*** -0.0257*** -0.0256*** 
 (0.00148) (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148) 
secondary school (SMU/SMA) -0.0362*** -0.0361*** -0.0362*** -0.0361*** -0.0362*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00173) 
SMK -0.0413*** -0.0412*** -0.0412*** -0.0413*** -0.0412*** 
 (0.00182) (0.00182) (0.00182) (0.00182) (0.00182) 
diploma I-II -0.0444*** -0.0443*** -0.0443*** -0.0444*** -0.0444*** 
 (0.00370) (0.00369) (0.00371) (0.00370) (0.00369) 
diploma III -0.0336*** -0.0335*** -0.0335*** -0.0336*** -0.0335*** 
 (0.00400) (0.00400) (0.00402) (0.00400) (0.00401) 
university -0.0238*** -0.0237*** -0.0237*** -0.0237*** -0.0237*** 
 (0.00315) (0.00315) (0.00315) (0.00315) (0.00315) 
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Independent Variables Wave Wave (age) Wave (gender) Wave (sector) Wave (urban) 
spouse's education  
never been to school 0.0268*** 0.0268*** 0.0269*** 0.0268*** 0.0270*** 
 (0.00361) (0.00360) (0.00361) (0.00360) (0.00361) 
attending primary 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00191) 
junior school (SMP) -0.0285*** -0.0285*** -0.0285*** -0.0285*** -0.0285*** 
 (0.00159) (0.00158) (0.00159) (0.00158) (0.00158) 
secondary school (SMU/SMA) -0.0369*** -0.0369*** -0.0369*** -0.0369*** -0.0369*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) 
SMK -0.0445*** -0.0445*** -0.0445*** -0.0445*** -0.0446*** 
 (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00200) 
diploma I-II -0.0394*** -0.0394*** -0.0394*** -0.0394*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.00377) (0.00376) (0.00377) (0.00378) (0.00377) 
diploma III -0.0110* -0.0110* -0.0112* -0.0110* -0.0111* 
 (0.00637) (0.00636) (0.00634) (0.00638) (0.00636) 
university -0.0132*** -0.0132*** -0.0132*** -0.0132*** -0.0133*** 
 (0.00430) (0.00429) (0.00429) (0.00430) (0.00429) 
Aug2008 -0.000846 -0.0361*** -0.00268 -0.00482** -0.00166 
 (0.00164) (0.0102) (0.00215) (0.00198) (0.00201) 
Feb2009 -0.00383* -0.0254** -0.00592** -0.00562** -0.00601** 
 (0.00197) (0.0128) (0.00260) (0.00242) (0.00239) 
Aug2008 (Mining)   0.0107   
   (0.0137)   
Aug2008 (Industry)   -0.00255   
   (0.00508)   
Aug2008 (Electrcity)   0.00249   
   (0.0299)   
Aug2008 (Constrctn)   0.00791   
   (0.00600)   
Aug2008 (Finance)   0.00430   
   (0.00460)   
Aug2008 (Transpt, Stor, & Comm)   0.0110*   
   (0.00653)   
Aug2008 (Trade, Htl, & Rest)   0.00711   
   (0.0196)   
Aug2008 (Social srvce)   -9.23e-05   
   (0.00530)   
Feb2009 (Mining)   0.000191   
   (0.0137)   
Feb2009 (Industry)   0.00149   
   (0.00682)   
Feb2009 (Electrcity)   -0.00969   
   (0.0288)   
Feb2009 (Constrctn)   0.00305   
   (0.00712)   
Feb2009 (Finance)   0.00547   
   (0.00567)   
Feb2009 (Transpt, Stor, & Comm)   0.00834   
   (0.00787)   
Feb2009 (Trade, Htl, & Rest)   0.0123   
   (0.0236)   
Feb2009 (Socialsrvce)   0.00548   
   (0.00685)   
Aug2008 (age)  0.00250***    
  (0.000774)    
Feb2009 (age)  0.00152    
  (0.000940)    
Aug2008 (female)    0.00892***  
    (0.00287)  
Feb2009 (female)    0.00398  
    (0.00338)  
Aug2008 (urban)     0.00269 
     (0.00357) 
Feb2009 (urban)     0.00741 
     (0.00461) 
Observations 246591 246591 246591 246591 246591 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
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Table A2. Determinants of Labor Force Participation 
   MARGINAL EFFECT (DP/DX)   
Independent Variables wave Wave (age) Wave (gender) Wave (urban) 
age 0.0734*** 0.0731*** 0.0734*** 0.0734*** 
 (0.000312) (0.000328) (0.000312) (0.000312) 
age squared -0.000830*** -0.000831*** -0.000830*** -0.000831*** 
 (4.06e-06) (4.05e-06) (4.06e-06) (4.05e-06) 
female -0.393*** -0.393*** -0.394*** -0.393*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00329) (0.00188) 
urban/rural -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.225*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0141) 
household size -0.00375*** -0.00374*** -0.00375*** -0.00375*** 
 (0.000724) (0.000725) (0.000724) (0.000724) 
dependency ratio -0.0329*** -0.0330*** -0.0329*** -0.0330*** 
 (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00165) 
highest education 
never been to school 0.00632 0.00599 0.00631 0.00635 
 (0.00485) (0.00486) (0.00485) (0.00484) 
attending primary -0.0887*** -0.0892*** -0.0887*** -0.0887*** 
 (0.00248) (0.00248) (0.00247) (0.00248) 
junior school (SMP) -0.0180*** -0.0182*** -0.0180*** -0.0181*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) 
secondary school (SMU/SMA) 0.0411*** 0.0410*** 0.0411*** 0.0410*** 
 (0.00311) (0.00312) (0.00311) (0.00311) 
SMK 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) (0.00364) 
diploma I-II 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 
 (0.00627) (0.00628) (0.00627) (0.00628) 
diploma III 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 
 (0.00611) (0.00611) (0.00611) (0.00611) 
university 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.00425) (0.00426) (0.00425) (0.00425) 
Aug2008 -0.00351 -0.00606 -0.00398 -0.0168*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00552) (0.00321) (0.00410) 
Feb2009 0.00342 -0.0266*** 0.00125 -0.00106 
 (0.00351) (0.00677) (0.00385) (0.00499) 
Aug2008 (age)  7.59e-05   
  (0.000150)   
Feb2009 (age)  0.000902***   
  (0.000181)   
Aug2008 (female)   0.000782  
   (0.00425)  
Feb2009 (female)   0.00366  
   (0.00506)  
Aug2008 (urban)    0.0291*** 
    (0.00569) 
Feb2009 (urban)    0.00992 
    (0.00693) 
Observations 1346553 1346553 1346553 1346553 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
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Table A3. Determinants of Unemployment 
  MARGINAL EFFECT (DP/DX)  
Independent Variables Wave Wave (age) Wave (gender) Wave (urban) 
age -0.00625*** -0.00578*** -0.00625*** -0.00626*** 
 (0.000170) (0.000185) (0.000170) (0.000170) 
age squared 3.57e-05*** 3.47e-05*** 3.57e-05*** 3.57e-05*** 
 (2.28e-06) (2.28e-06) (2.28e-06) (2.28e-06) 
female 0.0109*** 0.0108*** 0.0116*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.000714) (0.000709) (0.00141) (0.000714) 
household size 0.00309*** 0.00306*** 0.00309*** 0.00309*** 
 (0.000214) (0.000213) (0.000214) (0.000214) 
dependency ratio -0.0132*** -0.0130*** -0.0131*** -0.0131*** 
 (0.000798) (0.000794) (0.000797) (0.000798) 
highest education 
never been to school -0.0189*** -0.0189*** -0.0189*** -0.0189*** 
 (0.00205) (0.00203) (0.00205) (0.00205) 
attending primary -0.0111*** -0.0110*** -0.0111*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.00127) (0.00126) (0.00127) (0.00127) 
junior school (SMP) 0.0127*** 0.0126*** 0.0127*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) 
secondary school (SMU/SMA) 0.0417*** 0.0412*** 0.0416*** 0.0416*** 
 (0.00160) (0.00159) (0.00160) (0.00160) 
SMK 0.0554*** 0.0549*** 0.0554*** 0.0554*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00225) (0.00227) (0.00227) 
diploma I-II 0.0772*** 0.0768*** 0.0771*** 0.0772*** 
 (0.00528) (0.00526) (0.00528) (0.00528) 
diploma III 0.0519*** 0.0517*** 0.0519*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.00392) (0.00391) (0.00392) (0.00392) 
university 0.0726*** 0.0723*** 0.0726*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00331) (0.00333) (0.00333) 
urban/rural 0.00836*** 0.00838*** 0.00836*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00251) 
Aug2008 -0.00151 0.0188*** -0.00189 -0.000226 
 (0.000996) (0.00282) (0.00119) (0.00150) 
Feb2009 -0.00192 0.0129*** -0.000671 -0.000419 
 (0.00120) (0.00330) (0.00145) (0.00186) 
Aug2008 (age)  -0.000698***   
  (7.92e-05)   
Feb2009 (age)  -0.000514***   
  (9.47e-05)   
Aug2008 (female)   0.000882  
   (0.00158)  
Feb2009 (female)   -0.00301*  
   (0.00181)  
Aug2008 (urban)    -0.00239 
    (0.00195) 
Feb2009 (urban)    -0.00281 
    (0.00235) 
Observations 812473 812473 812473 812473 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
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Table A4. Determinants of Changing/Losing Job for Labor Demand Reasons of 
Those that Lost/Changed Their Job 
   MARGINAL EFFECT (DP/DX)     
Independent Variables Wave Wave (age) Wave (gender) Wave (sector) Wave (urban) 
age 0.0163*** 0.0161*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) 
age squared -0.000173*** -0.000173*** -0.000173*** -0.000173*** -0.000173*** 
 (1.69e-05) (1.69e-05) (1.69e-05) (1.68e-05) (1.68e-05) 
female -0.0348*** -0.0349*** -0.0401*** -0.0344*** -0.0348*** 
 (0.00693) (0.00692) (0.00817) (0.00694) (0.00693) 
highest education  
never been to school 0.0127 0.0125 0.0126 0.0130 0.0119 
 (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0200) 
attending primary 0.0254** 0.0253** 0.0253** 0.0255** 0.0250** 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
junior school (SMP) -0.00112 -0.00114 -0.00118 -0.00131 -0.00158 
 (0.00926) (0.00926) (0.00926) (0.00928) (0.00927) 
secondary school (SMU/SMA) -0.0388*** -0.0389*** -0.0389*** -0.0379*** -0.0390*** 
 (0.00998) (0.00997) (0.00997) (0.01000) (0.00997) 
SMK -0.0395*** -0.0395*** -0.0395*** -0.0392*** -0.0397*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
diploma I-II -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.131*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
diploma III -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
university -0.0856*** -0.0857*** -0.0856*** -0.0855*** -0.0856*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
urban/rural 0.0304* 0.0304* 0.0304* 0.0303* 0.0477*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0176) 
hhsize 0.000430 0.000442 0.000430 0.000322 0.000379 
 (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00217) 
dependency ratio 0.00763 0.00759 0.00763 0.00781 0.00757 
 (0.00631) (0.00631) (0.00631) (0.00632) (0.00632) 
previous sector of work 
Mining -0.0407 -0.0408 -0.0406 -0.0870*** -0.0413 
 (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0233) (0.0298) 
Industry 0.0692*** 0.0692*** 0.0692*** 0.0610*** 0.0692*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0179) (0.0162) 
Electricty, Gas & Wat -0.0705 -0.0704 -0.0705 -0.0683 -0.0706 
 (0.0569) (0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0896) (0.0571) 
Construction 0.0524*** 0.0523*** 0.0526*** 0.0630*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0224) (0.0157) 
Fin~cl Inst, Real Est -0.0429*** -0.0430*** -0.0430*** -0.0205 -0.0432*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0157) (0.0128) 
Transprt,,Stor. & Comm -0.0642*** -0.0643*** -0.0642*** -0.0729*** -0.0643*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0147) (0.0139) 
Trade, Hotel, & Restaurnt,  -0.0779*** -0.0779*** -0.0778*** -0.0775*** -0.0779*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0210) (0.0186) 
Social Services -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.118*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0126) (0.0115) 
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Independent Variables Wave Wave (age) Wave (gender) Wave (sector) Wave (urban) 
interaction terms 
Feb2009 0.0385*** 0.0276 0.0354*** 0.0350* 0.0514*** 
 (0.00911) (0.0191) (0.00959) (0.0210) (0.0135) 
Feb2009 (Mining)    0.104  
    (0.0789)  
Feb2009 (Industry)    0.0116  
    (0.0259)  
Feb2008 (Electrcity)    0.00662  
    (0.15727)  
Feb2008 (Constrctn)    0.0269  
    (0.0283)  
Feb2009 (Finance)    -0.0395*  
    (0.0224)  
Feb2009 (Transpt, Stor, & 
Comm)    0.0208  
    (0.0362)  
Feb2009 (Trade, Htl, & Rest)    -0.000911  
    (0.0479)  
Feb2009 (Socialsrvce)    0.0312  
    (0.0319)  
Feb2009 (age)  0.000320    
  (0.000516)    
Feb2009 (female)   0.00908   
   (0.0129)   
Feb2009 (urban)     -0.0276 
     (0.0171) 
      
Observations 34870 34870 34870 34870 34870 
Source: Sakernas data for respective years. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
